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FrankHold said:Maybe we have to split the task. Let ethereum do what it can best – transfer and organize the money flow. And let a poker routine run on a classic server outside of ethereum.
Maybe we have to split the task. Let ethereum do what it can best – transfer and organize the money flow. And let a poker routine run on a classic server outside of ethereum.
We give power of the network to the losing players. This is actual quite interesting and as I understand it NOT Pokereum’s solution.Interesting thoughts arise…and we start to wonder if that could possibly be the solution WITHOUT any sort of system of public/private tables etc.We think about a certain malicious party trying to lose enough money to take over the network…impossible or favorable for the players in the long run, in order to secure a network that will lose its integrity ultimately anyways.A malicious party losing to only its own accounts cannot be a very net loser.We can also think about possibilities for bots and bot pools to arise that are “losing players” on average, but receive enough supplemental private game rake (in exchange for acting as a random node) that being a slight loser plus the additional control of the network might be enough secure and equilibrium.A winning bot must necessarily PAY for some control of the network.A losing player gets a piece of the network and they can sell it.You want your poker network/stake to grow or shrink in relation to “domestic deposits” or “lost monies”.The incentive to own stake in the network can be collecting “rake” by acting as juror for private games.
We might assume that the table is full of malicious players except the hero. The worst scenario would be: all players are all-in, hero wins the hand, but 1 malicious player refuses to hand in a key in order to verify the game. |Hero could have potentially won his initial chipstack times the number of other players. The malicious group must not have anything to gain from colluding in this fashion: 1) they must not have any monetary gain 2) The honest player therefore must get back at least what he was supposed to win.
The escrow needs to cover the worst case scenario: the maximum # of malicious players (n-1 for a table of n player) times the maximum amount the honest player can lose (total equity or chipstack).